Abstract. Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was defined by [6] at CANS'07 and generalized by [5] at AFRICACRYPT'09. In the generalized setting, EPIR allows a user to evaluate a function on a database block such that the database can learn neither which function has been evaluated nor on which block the function has been evaluated and the user learns no more information on the database blocks except for the expected result. An EPIR protocol for evaluating polynomials over a finite field L was proposed by Bringer and Chabanne in [5] . We show that the protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement as they have claimed. In particular, we show that it does not give the user the expected result with large probability if one of the coefficients of the polynomial to be evaluated is primitive in L and the others belong to the prime subfield of L.
Introduction
Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was motivated by privacy-preserving biometric authentication and formally defined in [6] . It enables a user to privately evaluate a fixed and public function with two inputs, one chosen block from a database and one additional string. Two EPIR protocols were proposed in [6] . One is for testing equality and the other is for computing weighted Hamming distance. As a cryptographic primitive, EPIR has been generalized by [5] in order to attain more flexibility. In the generalized setting, the function to be evaluated is neither fixed nor public. Instead, it is chosen from a set of public functions by the user. A new EPIR protocol in the generalized setting was proposed in [5] . As noted in [6] , EPIR is indeed a combination of private informatrion retrieval [12] and general secure two-party computation [18] .
Related Work. Private information retrieval (PIR) was introduced by [12] . It allows a user to retrieve a data item from a database such that the database cannot learn which item the user is interested in. The requirement on the privacy of the identity of the retrieved data item is called user privacy. The main measure of the efficiency of a PIR protocol is its communication complexity, i.e., the total number of bits exchanged by the user and the database for retrieving a single bit. PIR protocols have been constructed in both the information-theoretic setting [1- 3, 10, 12, 13, 21, 29, 31] and the computational setting [7, 9, 11, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 30] .
out-of-N OT allows a receiver Bob to choose one of the N secrets held by a sender Alice such that Alice learns no information on Bob's choice and Bob cannot learn more except the secret he chooses. [27] proposed transformations from any PIR protocols to SPIR protocols in the computational setting. Their transformation requires only one execution of a given PIR protocol and log N executions of a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol. The notion of EPIR [5, 6] is essentially a generalization of SPIR in the computational setting.
EPIR is also related to selective private function evaluation [8] , oblivious polynomial evaluation [27] and private keyword search [15] . A selective private function evaluation protocol [8] allows a client to privately evaluate a public function on the inputs held by one or more servers. Comparing with EPIR, the client only decides on which inputs the public function will be evaluated. An oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol [27] allows a receiver to privately evaluate a polynomial function on his input, where the polynomial is held by a sender. Comparing with EPIR, the function to be evaluated is not known to the receiver and the input on which the function is evaluated is not known to the sender. A private keyword search protocol [15] allows a client to privately search a database with a keyword such that he learns the associated record if the keyword is contained in the database and learns nothing otherwise. In a sense, EPIR can also be seen as a generalization of the above problems.
Results. The protocol described in Section 4.3 of [5] will be our main topic in this paper and termed as Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol from now on. It was claimed [5] that the protocol enables a user to privately evaluate any polynomial F (t) ∈ L[t] on a chosen database block R i , where L = GF(p n ) is the field extension of degree n of the prime field K = GF(p). We study the correctness of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol and show that it may fail frequently. In particular, we show that, by executing the protocol, the user with input (
does not learn the expected result (i.e., F (R i )) with a large probability if F (t) ∈ P, where P = {f(t)
n − 1 and f k ∈ K for every k = l}. Methodology. Our argument is by contradiction. To simplify the argument, we first give a restricted version of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol. In the restricted version, the database is deterministic and only has one block, i.e., N = 1. We note that if the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol satisfies the correctness requirement, then so does the restricted version. We then show that the restricted version does not satisfy the correctness requirement if the polynomial to be evaluated is in P. This result allows us to conclude that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement as [5] has claimed.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the definition and security model of EPIR [5] . In Section 3, we recall the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol. In Section 4, we give a restricted version of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol and show that the restricted version fails frequently if the polynomial to be evaluated is in P. At last, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries

Definition
Following the definition of [5] , a single-database EPIR protocol is a protocol between a database DB who has N blocks (R 1 , . . . , R N ) ∈ ({0, 1} l 1 ) N and a user U who wants to evaluate F (R i ) for a function F ∈ F and an index i ∈ [N ], where F is a set of functions from {0, 1} l 1 to {0, 1} * and public. Such a protocol allows U to learn F (R i ) but no more information on the database blocks while DB learns no information on (F, i).
The above definition of EPIR is a generalization of [6] and provides the user with more flexibility of choosing the function F from a large set F. In the context of this definition, the EPIR for testing equality [6] has F = {IsEqual(·, X) : X ∈ {0, 1} l 1 }, where IsEqual(R i , X) = 1 if R i = X and 0 otherwise. The EPIR for computing weighted Hamming distance [6] 
i and X (j) are the j-th bits of R i and X, respectively).
Security Model
As in [5, 6] , we denote by retrieve(F, i) the query made by a user with input (F, i) ∈ F × [N ]. Without further notice, algorithms are assumed to be polynomial-time. If an algorithm A runs in k stages, then we shall write A = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k ). The security is evaluated by an experiment between an attacker and a challenger, where the challenger simulates the protocol executions and answers the attacker's oracle queries. For A a probabilistic algorithm, we denote by A(O, retrieve) the action to run A with access to any polynomial number of retrieve queries generated or answered (depending on the position of the attacker) by the oracle O. A function τ : Z → R is said to be negilible if for any polynomial P , there is an integer N P such that τ (n) ≤ 1/P (n) for every n ≥ N P . If τ (n) is negilible, then 1 − τ (n) is said to be overwhelming.
Correctness. An EPIR protocol is said to be correct if any query retrieve(F, i) returns the correct value of F (R i ) with an overwhelming probability when U and DB follow the protocol specification. User Privacy. Informally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect user privacy if for any query retrieve(F, i), DB learns no information on (F, i). Formally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect user privacy if any attacker A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ), acting as a malicious database, has only a negligible advantage
Database Privacy. Informally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect database privacy if a malicious user U cannot learn more information than
via a query retrieve. This intuitive description can be formalized via simulation principle by saying that the user U cannot determine whether he is interacting with a simulator which takes only (i ′ , F ′ (R i ′ )) as input, or with DB. We denote by S 0 the database DB. Formally, an EPIR protocol is said to respect database privacy if there is a simulator S 1 , which receives an auxiliary input Exp
Remark: The hypothetical oracle O is assumed to have unlimited computing resources, and S 1 always learns exactly the input related to the request made by the attacker.
Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
The EPIR protocols for testing equality and computing weighted Hamming distance of [6] are based on a pre-processing technique. Specifically, the user sends an encryption of its input (F, i) to DB, who then computes a temporary database which contains an encryption of F (R i ). Finally, the user executes a single-database CPIR protocol with DB to retrieve the encryption of F (R i ). This technique does not allow the evaluation of generic functions and incurs heavy computation during the computation of the temporary database. The Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol aims to avoid these deficiencies. It is based on ElGamal encryption schemes over the multiplicative groups of finite fields.
ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Let p be a prime and K = GF(p) be the finite field of order p. Let L = GF(p n ) be the finite field of order p n and G = L × be its multiplicative group of order q = p n − 1 for an integer n ≥ 2. Let g be a generator of G. The ElGamal encryption scheme over G is a triplet of algorithms Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), where (i) Gen is a key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 k and proceeds as follows:
a. generates the parameters p, n, q and g;
b. picks x ← Z q and computes y = g x ;
c. outputs pk = (q, g, y) as the public key and sk = x as the secret key.
(ii) Enc is an encryption algorithm which takes as input a plaintext m ∈ G, picks r ← Z q and outputs c = (g r , y r m) as the ciphertext.
(iii) Dec is a decryption algorithm which takes as input a ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ G 2 and outputs c 2 · c −x 1 .
Requirements on Database Blocks and Functions
Following the notations in Section 3.1, let α ∈ L be a primitive element of the field extension L/K. Then there is a polynomial
be the polynomial of degree < n such that Y (α) = y = g x . For the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol to be correct, it is required in [5] that for every j ∈ [N ], the database block R j should belong to D, where
The function to be evaluated by U can be any polynomial over
Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
Figure 1 is the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol, where most notations are adopted from Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. The authors of the protocol expect to embed the description of the polynomial F (t) ∈ L[t] chosen by U into an ElGamal ciphertext such that it can be evaluated by DB in an oblivious way.
(i) U : Generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk), where pk = (q, g, y), y = g x , and sk = x is randomly chosen from Z q . U also sends pk to let DB the possibility to verify the validity of pk as an ElGamal public key. In practice, the validity of pk can be certified by a TTP, and the same pk can be used by the user for all his queries.
(ii) U : For any polynomial function F : GF(p n ) → GF(p n ) and any index 1 ≤ i ≤ N , computes C 1 , . . . , C N and sends them to DB where
where V j and W j are polynomial over GF(p) of degree at most n − 1. (iii) DB: After reception of the C j , checks that they are nontrivial ElGamal ciphertexts and computes
by replacing each occurrence of α (resp. α l for all power l < n) with R j (resp. with R l j ). (iv) DB: Performs the product of all the C j together with a random encryption of 1, say The correctness of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol was claimed in [5] as follows. [5] ) A query (say retrieve(F, i)) gives the expected result (i.e., F (R i )) as soon as there is no index j for which one of the values G(R j ) or Y (R j ) is zero, which may occur only with a negligible probability in practice, leading to the correctness of the EPIR protocol.
Claim 3.1. (Section 4.4 of
On the Incorrectness of Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol
In this section, we show that Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement defined in Section 2.2. To simplify the argument, we give a restricted version of Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol in which DB is deterministic and N = 1. The restricted version satisfies the correctness requirement as long as Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol satisfies the correctness requirement. Then we turn to study the incorrectness of the restricted version.
Restricted Version
At step (iv) of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol, DB is randomizing the product N j=1 C j (R j ) and sending Enc(1) · N j=1 C j (R j ) to the user. We note that the user could have computed the same output if DB merely sends N j=1 C j (R j ). Therefore, we can safely modify step (iv) such that DB merely sends N j=1 C j (R j ) to U with no impact on the correctness of the protocol. Let i = N = 1. Then we have the restricted version (see Figure 2 ).
) and sends it to DB where r ∈ GF(p), s ∈ Z q are randomly chosen. The ciphertext C can be written as C = (V (α), W (α)) where V and W are polynomials over GF(p) of degree at most n − 1. (iii) DB: After reception of C , checks that it is a nontrivial ElGamal ciphertext and computes C(R) = (V (R), W (R)) by replacing each occurrence of α (resp. α l for all power l < n) with R (resp. with R l ). F, 1) ) in an execution of the restricted version gives U the expected result (i.e., F (R)) for any R ∈ G satisfying Y (R) = G(R) x and G(R) = 0.
Counterexample
We show that Claim 4.1 does not holds by a counterexample.
. Figure 3 is an execution of the restricted version which does not give U the expected result.
(i) U : Picks a private key sk = x = 6 ∈ Z 7 , sets y = g 2 + 1 and pk = (7, g, y). (pk, sk) is a pair of public and private keys for the ElGamal encryption scheme over group G. U sends pk to DB such that DB can verify the validity of pk as an ElGamal public key. Clearly, g = G(α) and y = Y (α) for polynomials G(t) = t, Y (t) = t 2 + 1 ∈ K[t] of degree less than 3. The field elements R ∈ L which satisfy equality
) and sends it to DB. Clearly, we have that V (t) = t 2 + 1 and W (t) = t 2 + t. (iii) DB: Sets the database block to be R = g 2 + g ∈ G. After receiving the ciphertext C = (g 2 +1, g 2 +g) from U , DB checks that C is a nontrivial ElGamal ciphertext and computes
by replacing each occurrence of α (resp. α l for all power l < n) with R (resp. with R l ). 
Failure Probability
We have seen that the restricted version may not give U the expected result in Section 4.2. However, given the counterexample, we cannot conclude that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement defined in Section 2.2. In fact, an EPIR protocol is said to be correct as long as it always gives U the expected result for any fixed input (
except with a negligible probability. In other words, as a collection of probabilistic algorithms, an EPIR protocol is allowed to fail with a negligible probability.
Therefore, to show that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement, it is necessary to compute the failure probability of the protocol, i.e., the probability that the protocol does not give U the expected result.
In this section, we study the failure probability of the restricted version. We show, through experimental results, that the restricted version does fail with large probability for certain choices of F (t) (e.g., F (t) = g).
From now on, we fix p = 2 to be the characteristic of all related finite fields. However, we stress that our methodology is applicable to any characteristic p. Following the notations of Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, let K = GF(2) and L = GF(2 n ) be the extension of K of degree n for an integer n ≥ 2. Let G = L × be the multiplicative group of L of order q = 2 n − 1 and g be a generator of G. W.l.o.g., we suppose α = g. Then G(t) = t ∈ K[t] is the polynomial of degree less than n such that G(α) = g. For every x ∈ Z q , let Y (t) ∈ K[t] be the polynomial of degree less than n such that Y (α) = y = g x . We define
Then the set of database blocks which satisfy the requirements imposed by Claim 4.1 (or in Section 3.2) is
We say that an execution of the restricted version is parameterized by (n, g, x, F, s, r, R) if x ∈ Z q , F (t) ∈ L[t], s ∈ Z q , r ∈ K and R ∈ D n,g,x are the private key, the polynomial to be evaluated, the randomness used at step (ii) of the restricted version and the database block held by DB, respectively. Let V (t), W (t) ∈ K[t] be the polynomials of degree less than n such that V (g) = g s and W (g) = y s (F (g) + r). Then the execution of the restricted version parameterized by (n, g, x, F, s, r, R) gives U the expected result if and only if V (R) = 0 and E(R) = 0, where
For an execution of the restricted version parameterized by (n, g, x, F, s, r, R), we define H x,s,r,F,R = 1 if V (R) = 0 and E(R) = 0, 0 otherwise.
Then the execution fails if and only if H x,s,r,F,R = 0. Therefore, the probability that an execution of the restricted version fails when x ∈ Z q is the private key and
is the polynomial chosen by U is exactly
Since s, r and R are uniformly distributed, we have that
2)
The probability that the restricted version fails when F (t) ∈ L[t] is the polynomial chosen by U is exactly
The probabilities η(n, g, F ) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 9 and F (t) = g are quite large and enumerated in Table 1 . 
Bringer-Chabanne EPIR Protocol Fails Frequently When F (t) = g
In this section, we show that the restricted version fails with large probability when F (t) = g. Specifically, for every integer n ≥ 2, we give lower bound on η(n, g, g).
We follow the notations in Section 4.3. For every j ∈ Z q , the set C = {j · 2 k mod q|k = 0, 1, 2, · · · } is called a cyclotomic coset mod q. By default, C is represented by the smallest number u ∈ C and denoted as
The number u is called the coset representative of C. Clearly, all distinct cyclotomic cosets mod q are pairwise disjoint and form a partition of Z q , i.e., Z q = u∈U C u , where U is the set of coset representatives of all distinct cyclotomic cosets mod q. (i) For every u ∈ U , the cardinality of C u is a divisor of n.
(ii) For every positive integer d|n, the number of cyclotomic cosets mod q of cardinality d is N 2 (d).
For every u ∈ U , we denote by
the set of field elements in L which share the same minimal polynomial over K with g u . For every x ∈ Z q , it is clear that there is a subset U x ⊆ U of coset representatives such that
Proof. It follows from the fact that D(t) ∈ K[t] and D(g) = 0.
Due to (4.1), E(t) is determined by the parameters g ∈ G, x ∈ Z q , F (t) ∈ L[t], s ∈ Z q and r ∈ K. Next lemma shows that E(t) and D(t) only share a very small number of roots in L when F (t) = g. Lemma 4.3. Suppose F (t) = g. Then for every x ∈ Z q , u ∈ U x , s ∈ Z q and r ∈ K, either V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u or E(t) has at most one root in D u .
Proof. If V (g u ) = 0, then V (g 2 j ·u ) = V (g u ) 2 j = 0 for any j ∈ N, i.e., V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u . Otherwise, we show that E(t) has at most one root in D u . Due to (4.1), we have that
Suppose that E(t) has two different roots in D u , say g u·2 j and g u·2 k , where 0 ≤ j < k < n. Then
It follows that
Since r ∈ K, the above equality implies g 2 n−j = g 2 n−k . Since g is primitive, we have (2 n −1)|(2 n−j −2 n−k ). It follows that n|(k−j), which is a contradiction.
The following lemma gives lower bound on ǫ(n, g, x, g) for any private key x ∈ Z q .
Lemma 4.4.
For every x ∈ Z q , we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1 − |U x | |D n,g,x | .
Proof. Due to (4.2) and (4.4), we have that
Let s ∈ Z q and r ∈ K be arbitrary. Due to Lemma 4.3, for every u ∈ U x , either V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u , or E(t) has at most one root in D u . It follows that
We want to bound ǫ(n, g, x, g) for various settings of n and x. As the first case, we suppose that n is a prime and have the following lemma:
Proof. Due to Lemma 4.1, |C u | divides n for every x ∈ Z q and u ∈ U x . Since n is prime, we have that |C u | = 1 or n.
(i) If |U x | = 1, then U x = {1} due to Lemma 4.2. It is obvious that |C 1 | = n. By Lemma 4.4, we have
(ii) If |U x | > 1 and 0 ∈ U x , then we have that
(iii) If |U x | > 1 and 0 / ∈ U x , then we have that
Below we lower bound ǫ(n, g, x, g) for any integer n ≥ 2 and private key x ∈ Z q . For any positive integer d|n, we set λ x.d = |{u : u ∈ U x and C u is of cardinality d}|.
Due to Lemma 4.2 and the requirements on database block R (imposed by Claim 4.1), λ x = (λ x,d ) belongs to the following set
where the coordinates of λ x and z are indexed by positive divisors of n. Due to Lemma 4.4, we have that
We turn to upper bound the following function
Because this is relatively hard, we turn to upper bound the function
where z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) is taken from the following set
Let ω(n) be the maximum value of φ n (z) on Φ n , i.e.,
Lemma 4.6. For every x ∈ Z q , we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1 − ω(n).
Due to Lemma 4.6, it is sufficient to upper bound ω(n).
Proof. It is trivial to verify that ξ 1 = ξ 2 = 1 for n = 2. Let n ≥ 3.
(i) For every (0, z 2 , . . . , z n ), (1, z 2 , . . . , z n ) ∈ Φ n , it is easy to see that
which implies that ξ 1 = 1.
(ii) For every (1, z 2 , . . . , z n−1 , z n ), (1, z 2 , . . . , z n−1 , 1) ∈ Φ n (where z n > 1), it is easy to see that
which implies that ξ n = 1.
(iii) Suppose 0 < ξ h < N 2 (h) for some integer 1 < h < n. Let
Then due to the maximality of ω(n), we have that
.
The above inequalities imply that C 3 + C 4 = hC 1 + hC 2 . Hence, we have
(iv) We claim that ξ a = N 2 (a) for every 1 < a < h. Otherwise, by (iii), we have that ξ a = 0 and
which is a contradiction.
(v) We claim that ξ b = 0 for every h < b < n. Otherwise, by (iii), we have that
(vi) Finally, we show that ω(n) = φ n (1, N 2 (2), . . . , N 2 (h), 0, . . . , 0, 1). Due to (iii), (iv) and (v), we have that
which is a contradiction. Therefore, hC 1 − C 3 = n − h.Then it is not hard to verify that
Therefore, we could have taken ξ = (1, N 2 (2), . . . , N 2 (h), 0, . . . , 0, 1).
Due to Lemma 4.7, for every integer n ≥ 3, there is at least one integer 1 < h < n such that
Note that the integer h may be not unique. For every integer n ≥ 3, we define
where 1 < h < n} (4.7)
to be the smallest integer 1 < h < n such that (4.6) holds. Next lemma shows that h(n) is an increasing function of n.
Lemma 4.8.
We have that h(n + 1) ≥ h(n) for every integer n ≥ 3.
Proof. Due to the definition of h(·) by (4.7), it is not hard to see that N 2 (2) , . . . , N 2 (l − 1), 0, 0, . . . , 0, 1) for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). Equivalently, we have that
for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). Due to (4.8), it is not hard to verify that
for every integer 2 ≤ l ≤ h(n). In particular, (4.9) holds for l = h(n). This implies that h(n + 1) ≥ h(n).
On the other hand, ω(n) is a decreasing function of n:
Lemma 4.9. We have that ω(n + 1) < ω(n) for every integer n ≥ 3.
Proof. By Lemma 4.8, we have that h(n + 1) ≥ h(n). If h(n + 1) = h(n), then
where the first and third inequalities follow from the definition of h(·) by (4.7). Table 2 . The values of h(n) and ω(n)
We enumerate the values of h(n) and ω(n) for some integers n in Table 2 .
Lemma 4.10. For every integer n ≥ 7, we have that ω(n) ≥ 5 n + 9 .
Proof. Due to Table 2 and Lemma 4.8, we have that h(n) ≥ 3 for every integer n ≥ 7. It follows that ω(n) ≥ φ n (1, 1, 2, 0, . . . , 0, 1) = 5/(n + 9).
At last, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11. We have that
Proof. Table 2 shows that ω(n) ≤ 2/n for every integer 2 ≤ n ≤ 6. Due to Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6, we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ max{1 − 2/n, 1 − ω(n)} = 1 − ω(n) for n = 2, 3, 5, and ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1 − ω(n) for n = 4, 6. Due to (4.3), we have that
Due to Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.10, we have that ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ max{1 − 2/n, 1 − ω(n)} = 1 − 2/n if n ≥ 7 is prime and ǫ(n, g, x, g) ≥ 1 − ω(n) if n ≥ 7 is composite. Due to (4.3), we have that η(n, g, g) ≥ 1 − 2/n if n ≥ 7 is prime and η(n, g, g) ≥ 1 − ω(n) if n ≥ 7 is composite. By Theorem 4.11, Lemma 4.9 and Table 2 , we see that η(n, g, g) is always non-negligible. Hence, we have the following theorem. 
Extension to A Set of Polynomials
In this section, we extend Theorem 4.12 to a set of polynomials F (t) ∈ L[t]. In particular, we follow the notations in Section 4.4 and show that the restricted version does not satisfy the correctness requirement if F (t) ∈ P, where
Note that the polynomial F (t) = g ∈ L[t] we studied in Section 4.4 is in P and satisfies Lemma 4.3, which is critical for obtaining all subsequent lemmas and theorems. Next lemma shows that Lemma 4.3 holds for any polynomial F (t) ∈ P as well.
Lemma 4.13. Let F (t) ∈ P. Then for every x ∈ Z q , u ∈ U x , s ∈ Z q and r ∈ K, either V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u or E(t) has at most one root in D u .
Proof. If V (g u ) = 0, then V (g u·2 j ) = V (g u ) 2 j = 0 for every j ∈ N, i.e., V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u . Otherwise, we have V (β) = 0 for every β ∈ D u . Suppose F (t) = d k=0 F k t k , where F l ∈ L is of order q and F k ∈ K for every k = l. We show that E(t) has at most one root in D u , where E(t) = W (t) + V (t)
x (F (t) + r).
Suppose E(t) has two different roots in D u , say g u·2 a and g u·2 b , where 0 ≤ a < b < n. Then
It follows that (F (g u·2 a ) + r) 2 n−a = (F (g u·2 b ) + r) 2 n−b . . Since F l ∈ L is primitive, we have (2 n − 1)|(2 n−a − 2 n−b ) and therefore n|(b − a), which is a contradiction.
Due to Lemma 4.13, we note that all lemmas and theorems subsequent to Lemma 4.3 in Section 4.4 can be generalized for any polynomial F (t) ∈ P. Therefore, we have that Theorem 4.14. The restricted version does not satisfy the correctness requirement if F (t) ∈ P.
Extension to Any Characteristic p > 2
We have stressed in Section 4.3 that our methodology is applicable when the characteristic of all related finite fields is any prime p. For example, it is obvious that we have an analog of Lemma 4.6 for any characteristic p > 2. Let ω p (n) be an analog of the function ω(n) when the characteristic of all related finite fields is a prime p > 2. Then the following theorem holds as well.
Theorem 4.15.
We have that η(n, g, g) ≥ 1 − ω p (n) for every integer n ≥ 2, where g ∈ GF(p n ) is primitive and p is an arbitrary prime number.
It follows that Theorem 4.14 also holds when the characteristic of all related finite fields is any prime p > 2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement. To simplify the argument, we give a restricted version of the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol . If the original protocol satisfies the correctness requirement, then so does the restricted version. We show that the restricted version fails frequently if the polynomial to be evaluated has some special property. This allows us to get the expected conclusion, i.e., the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement.
